Abstract: Security of data communication becomes a crucial challenge due to the rapid development of computer and information technologies. To ensure security of resource transmission, engineers have proposed numerous schemes for protection. Among them, the remote password authentication schemes using smart cards are regarded as very efficient. As a result, smart-card based authentication schemes has become a popular research topic in recent years. In 2000, Hwang and Li proposed a new remote authentication scheme using smart cards based on ElGamal's cryptosystem. Unfortunately, the scheme Hwang and Li propose suffers from some security flaws. In this article, the authors propose a practical and secure version providing mutual authentication, increasing the authentication efficiency, and allowing the user to choose and change his/ her password at will.
Introduction
The control of the access to remote resources has become a crucial challenge due to the rapid development of computer and information technologies. Generally, most of the resources provided on Internet are not free for all users. Often, some services on the remote servers are paid. In other words, the providers of the services/ facilities have to put their resources under appropriate protection. The password authentication schemes are usually considered as the most efficient and practical method to achieve the goal of protecting remote resources. In the password authentication schemes, the user sends his/ her identity (ID) and password (PW) to the server in order to get authentication when he/ she wants to access facilities on the remote system. ID and PW are issued to the user by the remote server in the registration phase. If the user is authenticated successfully, the user will be authorized to access the facilities provided by the remote system; otherwise, the access request will be rejected.
1,2,3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 In 1981, Lamport proposed a remote authentication scheme for communication through insecure channels. 11 Lamport's scheme can withstand the replay attack and it needs a verification table to verify the legality of the login user. Nevertheless, the verification table makes Lamport's scheme suffer from the stolen-verifier attack if somehow an intruder succeeds to get the stored verifier. Recently, a great deal of password authentication schemes using smart cards has been proposed to improve the traditional authentication schemes. The smart card is used to authenticate the legality of the user such that it is unnecessary for the remote server to store the verification table. Hence, the stolen-verifier attack can be resolved. 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 What is more important, a timestamp is often used to resist the replay attack. However, sophisticated hardware is needed to support the concurrent mechanism.
In 1994, Chang and Liao proposed a remote authentication scheme based on ElGamal's signature scheme. 20 Later, Wu proposed an efficient remote authentication scheme based on a simple geometric approach. 21 Wu's scheme makes possible the user to choose his/ her password at will. Unfortunately, Hwang has found and outlined weaknesses in Wu's scheme. 22 In 2000, Hwang and Li proposed a novel remote authentication scheme (Hwang-Li's scheme) using smart cards based on ElGamal's cryptosystem. 23 Shortly afterwards, Chan and Cheng demonstrated that the scheme of Hwang and Lee is insecure as well. 24 Besides, in 2003, Shen, Lin, and Hwang presented another attack on Hwang-Li's scheme. 25 Furthermore, mutual authentication between the remote server and the user is essential to ensure the security of the data transmitted over the insecure networks. But in most of these schemes, only the user is authenticated. 26, 27, 28 Therefore, in this article the authors propose an efficient and secure authentication scheme. The proposed scheme not only provides mutual authentication between the remote server and the user but also increases the efficiency of authentication. Furthermore, the attacks that Hwang-Li's scheme cannot resist do not affect the proposed scheme.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The article first reviews the scheme proposed by Hwang and Li. Some attacks on Hwang-Li's scheme are presented afterwards. A novel scheme is then proposed. Next, the security of the proposed scheme is analyzed, followed with discussions. Finally, the authors give some conclusions and outline directions for future research.
Review of Hwang-Li's Scheme
This section reviews the scheme proposed by Hwang and Li and then presents possible attacks on that scheme.
In this subsection, the authors briefly review the remote password authentication scheme of Hwang and Li. 29 The security of Hwang-Li's scheme is based on the ElGamal's public key cryptosystem. Hwang-Li's scheme is divided into three phases: registration phase, login phase and authentication phase. The details of the three phases are shown below.
Registration Phase
Let x be a secret key maintained by the system and ) ( 
Login Phase
When the user i U decides to access data from the remote site, he/she has to insert his/her smart card into the input device and type his/her identity i ID and password i PW first. The smart card then executes the following procedure:
• Step 1: Generates a random number r .
• Step 2:
•
Step 3:
, where T is the current timestamp of the input device and ⊕ denotes an exclusive "or" operation.
• Step 4:
Step 5:
• Step 6: Sends the message
to the remote server.
Authentication Phase
Upon receiving M from i U , the system authenticates i U by performing the following procedure:
• Step 1: Checks the validity of i ID . If the format of i ID is not correct, rejects the access request; otherwise, the procedure goes to the next step.
Step 2: Checks the validity of the time interval between T and T ′ . If
, rejects the access request; otherwise, performs the next step.
Here T ′ is the current timestamp of the system and T Δ is the acceptable time interval of the transmission delay.
Step 3: Checks if
If it holds, the access request is accepted; otherwise, terminates the connection.
Review of Chan-Cheng's Attack
In 
U successfully obtains h U 's password to access the remote system as h U .
The Proposed Scheme
Due to the fact that the computational ability of the smart card is usually low, it is quite important to reduce the computation load of the smart card to increase the efficiency of authentication. In addition, mutual authentication between the remote system and the user is also an essential requirement in remote password authentication schemes as mentioned above. Therefore, the authors propose an efficient password authentication scheme that not only ensures mutual authentication between the remote system and the user to enhance security, but also increases the efficiency of authentication. Besides, the proposed scheme also overcomes the security weaknesses present in Hwang-Li's scheme. In the proposed scheme, in order to make the password authentication scheme more user-friendly, the user is permitted to choose his/her password at will.
The scheme proposed in this article also consists of three phases: registration phase, login phase and authentication phase. Figure 1 presents the flowchart of the login and authentication phases of the scheme. The three phases could be described as follows.
Registration Phase
Let p and q be the secret keys maintained by the system and ) (⋅ H be the one-way hash function, where p and q are large prime numbers. g is a primitive element in ) (n GF , where q p n ⋅ = . First, for registration, a new user i U has to submit his/her identity i ID and the password i PW chosen by himself/ herself to the system using a secure channel. After receiving the registration request, the remote system performs the following operations:
Step 2: Computes temp as follows: . mod • Step 3:
Login Phase
When the user i U wants to access the facilities offered by the remote system, he/she has to insert the smart card into the input device and enter i ID and i PW . The smart card then executes the following procedure:
• Step 1: Generates a random number u r , which is used only once.
• Step 2: Computes ) ( i PW H .
Step 3: Retrieves temp .
Step 5: Computes temp r u ⋅ .
• Step 6: Sends the message } , { temp r ID M u i ⋅ = to the remote system.
Authentication Phase
After sending M to the system, the system and the user i U execute the following procedure to authenticate each other. and compares it with the received one. If they are not equivalent, the connection is terminated; otherwise, the remote system is authenticated successfully by the user i U , and the phase continues.
Step 5: The smart card computes ) ( s r H and sends the result to the remote system.
• 
Security Analysis
This section will demonstrate that the proposed remote password authentication scheme is secure with the following attack scenarios.
The Replay Attack
The replay attacks cannot work on the proposed scheme. That is, retransmitting neither the login message
in the login phase nor the response mes-
in the authentication phase will succeed since the validity of M and M ′ can be checked with the random numbers u r and s r , respectively. Even if an intruder eavesdrops M successfully in the login phase and replays M to fool the remote server, he/she will fail in Step 3 of the authentication phase. The reason is that only the legal user can retrieve s r chosen by the remote system, and s r is used only once. On the other hand, if an intruder eavesdrops M ′ in the authentication phase and retransmits it to fool the login user, he/she will fail in Step 4 of the authentication phase. The value of ) mod ( n r r H s u ⋅ is not equal to the replayed one since the random number u r is used only once and it is absolutely different from the replayed one.
Deriving the Secret Key of the Remote Server
When an intruder attempts to derive the secret key of the remote system, p and q , from n , he/she will fail. The reason is that he/she will encounter the difficulties of solving the factoring problems.
Losing the Smart Card
An intruder will also fail in the case when he/she steals the smart card of the legal user i U and wants to use it to access the facilities provided by the remote server. The reason is that the intruder can not retrieve temp without knowing i PW .
The Server Spoofing Attack
When a masqueraded server intends to cheat an innocent user, it cannot fake a response message
. First, it is due to the fact that the intruder cannot retrieve temp as stated before. Second, without knowing temp , u r , used only once, also cannot be obtained successfully.
The Stolen-Verifier Attack
In the scheme proposed in this article, no verification table is needed. That is, it is impossible for an attacker to mount the stolen-verifier attack on it.
Discussion
The security flaws of the remote password authentication scheme proposed by Hwang and Li do not affect the scheme proposed here. On the other hand, when a legal user i U wants to change his/her password, he/she only needs to submit his/her smart card to the remote system together with a new password i W P ′ through a secure channel. PW to login to the remote server. Therefore, it is easy for the user to change the password and to remember it. In other words, the proposed scheme enables the users to choose and change their passwords at will. Table 1 provides comparison between the characteristics of the proposed scheme and the scheme of Hwang and Li. Among the considered characteristics, mutual authenti- cation is only present in the proposed scheme to enhance security as elaborated in a previous section. In addition, the proposed scheme can withstand the replay attack without employing the timestamp as shown above. In other words, the scheme presented in this article does not require an additional sophisticated concurrent mechanism to resist the replay attack.
What is more important, in what follows the authors present efficiency comparisons between the proposed scheme and Hwang-Li's scheme in order to demonstrate that the scheme proposed here is not only more secure but also more efficient. Nowadays, most of the servers have high computational power, while the smart cards are still with low computation ability. The key point in improving the efficiency of the authentication processes is reducing the computation load of the smart card. Therefore, the authors have made the computation load of the smart card as light as possible in the scheme they propose.
First, the authors define the symbols used in Table 2 . e denotes the exponential computation operation. h denotes the computation operation of the one-way hash func- Considering the several computation operations, the exponential operation is of main concern for the whole computation load since the computation load of the exponential operation is far heavier than that of the other operations. According to Table 2 , it is evident that the proposed scheme is more efficient than Hwang-Li scheme. It is because only one exponential operation is needed for mutual authentication.
Conclusions
In this article, the authors propose a novel remote password authentication scheme that overcomes the security weaknesses of Hwang-Li's scheme. The proposed scheme provides mutual authentication between the remote system and the user such that the server spoofing attack cannot have an effect. Besides, the scheme allows the user to choose and change passwords at will and can resist the replay attack without sophisticated concurrent mechanisms.
As mentioned above, the proposed scheme is more efficient, secure and user-friendly than Hwang-Li's scheme. Since the computation load of both the smart card and the whole system is quite low, the proposed scheme is efficient, secure, user-friendly to be applied in practice; moreover it could be employed on imbalanced networks as well.
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